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Abstract
This paper studies the designs of optimal tax programs in OLG economies when first,
consumption of one household lowers (status) utility of others, and second, consumption
harms the environment. Status seeking raises optimal consumption tax rates, and lowers
optimal tax rates on capital income.
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This paper examines optimal tax programs that aim to internalize two ex-
ternalities: a status externality and an environmental externality.
In an insightful article, Ono (1996) investigates two optimal tax programs
in an overlapping generations (OLG) economy where consumption of ﬁnitely
lived generations causes a negative environmental externality. Consumption
in period t causes the environment to deteriorate as of period t + 1. While
households derive utility from the environment, the old generation has no
incentive to care for environmental quality in future periods. Ono (1996)
demonstrates that the externality can be internalized by both a consump-
tion tax program with a higher consumption tax rate for old than for young
households, and a second tax program with a uniform consumption tax to-
gether with a capital income tax.
In the present paper households gain utility not only from environmental
quality. They also derive utility from the status achieved by consuming at
above-average levels. Striving for status, however, leads to overconsumption
and overuse of the environment. Thus, the desire to keep up with the Joneses
has to be considered in the design of an optimal tax program.
It is important to consider the interactions between the status externality
and the environmental externality for the following reasons. First, status
seeking has an impact on optimal tax levels. The desire for status raises the
optimal levels of consumption taxes and lowers the optimal level of a capital
income tax. This result represents a new and diﬀerent rationalization of an
extensively discussed tax reform proposal according to which the tax base
should be switched from (capital) income to consumption. Second, status
seeking has an impact on the optimal tax structure. In a framework where
overlapping generations live for two periods each, the desire for status lowers
the optimal tax rate of second period consumption relative to the optimal
tax rate of ﬁrst period consumption. In the case of a uniform consumption
tax, the desire for status lowers the optimal capital income tax rate relative
to the optimal consumption tax rate.
In addition to Ono (1996), there are several models in the literature that
are related to the model in this paper. Ono (2002) analyzes the impact of
habitual consumption on the environment in a similar OLG framework. He
shows that consumption habits are potentially harmful to the environment.
Ng and Wang (1993) show that status seeking leads to overconsumption.
Both papers, however, do not look at optimal tax programs. Howarth (1996)
also analyzes status eﬀects and environmental externalities. He derives ef-
ﬁcient consumption and pollution tax rates. His model, however, is static.
Therefore, in contrast to the present note, Howarth (1996) does not consider
1capital income taxes.
Section 2 of this note presents the OLG model and shows the social
optimum. Section 3 discusses competitive equilibria with taxes and transfers
and demonstrates that the social optimum can be achieved by two diﬀerent
optimal tax programs. Section 4 concludes the note.
2 The Social Optimum
We consider a fully competitive economy where economic activity is per-
formed over inﬁnite discrete time. In each period there are two identical
overlapping generations, one young and one old. Each generation endures
for two periods and exhibits preferences for consumption in both periods,
c1 and c2, and for environmental quality, which is measured by an index E.
Superscripts 1 and 2 refer to the ﬁrst and second period of life respectively.
Each young household is endowed with Lt units of labor. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume a zero growth rate of the population, n =0 ,a n ds e t
Lt = L0 =1 .
Preferences of a generation born in period t are given by the utility func-
tion1





T h ev a r i a b l eˆ c1 denotes eﬀective consumption in the ﬁrst period of life:
ˆ c1 ≡ c1 − γ1 C,w h e r eC ≥ 0 is average consumption across all households.2
The parameter γ1 ∈ [0,1) determines the relative importance of average con-
sumption. It indexes the desire of young households for status. The higher
γ1 is, the more young households care for status and for the consumption
level of their peers. Similarly, ˆ c2 ≡ c2 − γ2 C,w h e r eγ2 ∈ [0,1). If γ1 > 0
and γ2 > 0 a household not only derives utility from absolute consumption
but also from consumption relative to average consumption (status).
The index of environmental quality, E, evolves according to




t)+δm t . (2)
Without economic activity, E tends to an autonomous level of zero, where
the parameter b ∈ (0,1) determines the speed of adjustment. Environmental
quality is negatively aﬀected by consumption if β>0 and positively aﬀected
by maintenance investment, m,i fδ>0.
1The assumption that only Et+1 is considered in the utility function follows the work
of John and Pecchenino (1994) as well as that of Ono (1996).
2This formulation of status, or relative consumption, is equal to the keeping up with
the Joneses formulation used in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000).
2Production of a single commodity follows a production function f(k)t h a t
is homogeneous of degree one, where k is capital intensity. Output is allocated
to consumption, capital accumulation, and maintenance investment. Let us
assume that capital depreciation is complete. Then the resource constraint
becomes




t − mt =0. (3)
For all t ≥ 0, a social planner chooses c1
t,c 2
t,k t,m t (and implicitly Et),
where k0 and E0 are given. She takes into account (i) the resource constraint
(3), (ii) the environmental constraint (2), and (iii) the average consumption
level Ct =( Lt c1
t + Lt−1 c2
t)/(Lt + Lt−1)=( c1
t + c2
t)/2i ne a c hp e r i o dt.T h e
social planner discounts future generations’ utilities. This case gives rise to





t Ut , (4)
where 0 <ρ<1 denotes the social discount factor. The time index starts
with −1 because the generation born in −1 still consumes in period 0. The
case where the social planner does not discount future generations’ utilities
is shortly discussed in the Appendix.



















 (k)=1 /ρ, (7)
f(k)=c
1 + c
2 + k + m, (8)
E = −β (c
1 + c
2)/b + δm / b, (9)
where ui(ˆ c1, ˆ c2,E ) denotes the partial derivative of u(ˆ c1, ˆ c2,E ) with respect
to the i-th argument. Details of the derivation of these conditions are pro-
vided in the Appendix.
3 Competitive Equilibria with Taxes
and Transfers
Each young household inelastically supplies its labor endowment to the labor
market in the ﬁrst period of life, and receives, in return, a wage rate w =
3f(k) − kf (k) per unit of labor. Wage income is allocated to savings, s,
consumption, and maintenance investment. Once the household becomes
old and enters period 2, both savings and interest income Rs= f (k)k are
fully consumed.3
Let us consider consumption taxes, τc1,τ c2, lump-sum taxes and transfers,











Variable t1, if positive, represents a lump-sum tax. The government budget
constraint is: t2
t+1 = τc1 c1
t+1 + τc2 c2
t+1 + Rt+1 st τk + t1
t+1.
Each generation chooses consumption, savings, and maintenance invest-
ment in order to maximize utility (1), subject to the budget constraints
(10) and to the environmental constraint (2). In contrast to the social
planner, households consider average consumption C as given. A com-
petitive equilibrium with taxes and transfers, in a steady state, is a tuple
CET = {c1,c 2,k ,m ,E } that follows from:
u1(ˆ c
1, ˆ c












1 (1 + τc1)=f(k) − kf
 (k) − k − m − t
1 , (13)
c
2 (1 + τc2)=f
 (k)k(1 − τk)+t
2 , (14)
E = −β (c
1 + c
2)/b + δm / b, (15)
τc1,τ c2,τ k,t
1 given.
Assign two diﬀerent sets of instruments to the government. Regime A: The
government imposes two consumption taxes, τc1,a n dτc2,a n dt h e r ei sn oc a p -
ital income tax. Regime B: The government imposes a uniform consumption
tax, τc, and a capital income tax, τk.
Proposition 1 (Tax Regime A) There exists an optimal tax program, such
that SO = CET,w i t h
τc1 =
(β + δ)[γ1 + γ2 +( 1− b)ρΓ]
δΓ[1− ρ(1 − b)]





1 = f(k) − (1 + ρ)/ρk − m − c
1 (1 + τc1), Γ ≡ (2 − γ
1 − γ
2).
3Since the rate of depreciation of capital equals unity, the interest factor R equals f(k).
4Proof. The optimal consumption tax rate τc1 follows from equating the ﬁrst
order conditions (5) and (11), and solving for τc1. Similarly, τc2 follows from
equating the ﬁrst order conditions (6) and (12). The level of the lump-sum
tax, t1, is chosen such that f (k)=1 /ρ. Q.E.D.
Notice that the higher β is, the larger are the optimal consumption tax
rates. I.e., the parameter β indexes the strength of the negative externality
of consumption on environmental quality. Proposition 1 shows that τc2 >τ c1
whenever β>0. While the young generation considers the impact of its
consumption on environmental qualitya tl e a s tf o rt h ep e r i o dt h a tf o l l o w s ,
the old generation does not consider the impact of its consumption on envi-
ronmental quality at all. Thus, the optimal tax rate on c2 must be higher
than on c1 in order to internalize these externalities. If γ1 = γ2 =0 ,a n d
ρ = 1, Ono’s (1996, p.286) optimal tax scheme follows.
Proposition 2 An increase in the desire for status, γ1 or γ2,i m p l i e sar i s e
in both the optimal consumption tax rates and the optimal ratio τc1/τc2.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that γ1 = γ2 = γ.I n t h i s c a s e ∂τ c1/∂ γ = ∂τ c2/∂ γ =
(β + δ)/[(1 − ρ(1 − b))δ(−1+γ)2] > 0. The higher the status parameter
the higher are both optimal tax rates. Each unit of consumption of one
household causes an external cost for all other households in terms of status
loss. The optimal tax program accounts for this negative externality by a
rise in consumption tax rates.
An increase in the status parameter γ also implies a rise in the optimal
tax ratio τc1/τc2. According to Proposition 1, τc1/τc2 = τc1/(τc1+β/δ). Thus,
∂ (τc1/τc2)/∂ γ =( τc2)−2β/δ(∂τ c1/∂ γ) > 0. As a result of status seeking,
the tax burden shifts more to the young consumers. Notice that in the limit,
as γ approaches unity, τc1 → τc2.
If γ1  = γ2, similar results hold. For the same reasons as above ∂τ ci/∂ γ1 =
∂τ cj/∂ γ2 > 0, i =1 ,2; j =1 ,2, and ∂ (τc1/τc2)/∂ γ1 = ∂ (τc1/τc2)/∂ γ2 > 0.
Under regime A, there are diﬀering consumption tax rates for young and
old generations. There are two arguments, motivating this tax regime. First,
Ono (1996) used a similar tax program, and the present paper extends the
results obtained by Ono (1996). Second, Erosa and Gervais (2002) demon-
strate, for life-cycle economies, it is optimal to tax consumption goods uni-
formly over the lifetime of an individual only when the optimal τk is zero.
However, below it is shown that the optimal τk is positive. Hence, optimal
consumption tax rates must diﬀer among individuals belonging to diﬀerent
generations.
If consumption tax rates cannot be conditioned on age in practice4,t h e
4A referee rightly pointed out that it is hard to think of the implementation of non-
5tax program must be implemented by an equivalent tax program for which
tax rates can be conditioned on age. One such tax program is one with a
uniform consumption tax plus a tax on labor income that exactly mimics the
age-conditioned consumption tax rates.5
Proposition 3 (Tax Regime B) There exists an optimal tax program, such












{Γ[1− ρ(1 − b)]},
t
1 = f(k) − (1 + ρ)/ρk − m − c
1 (1 + τc).
As before, the optimal tax rates follow from the ﬁrst order conditions of both
the social optimum (5) and (6) and the competitive equilibrium with taxes
and transfers (11) and (12). As a special case, if γ1 = γ2 =0 ,a n dρ =1 ,
Ono’s (1996, p.288) optimal tax scheme follows.
For the optimal tax program with diﬀerentiated consumption taxes it was
shown that τc2 >τ c1. Here, in the optimal tax program with a capital income
tax there is a uniform tax rate on consumption: τc1 = τc2 = τc.T h u s ,t h e
social optimum requires a lowering of second period consumption by τk > 0.
Proposition 4 An increase in the desire for status implies a rise in the
optimal consumption tax rate and a decline in the the optimal capital income
tax rate.
Suppose that γ1 = γ2 = γ.A r i s e i nγ leads to higher consumption in the
competitive equilibrium (without taxes and transfers). Thus, the optimal
consumption tax rate increases: ∂τ c/∂ γ =( β+δ)/[[1−ρ(1−b)]δ(1−γ)2] >
0. Moreover, a rise in γ also leads to a lower optimal tax rate on capital
income: ∂τ k/∂ γ = −[1 − ρ(1 − b)]β/(β + δ) < 0. For the tax program with
diﬀerentiated consumption tax rates it was shown that an increase in γ lowers
the optimal tax ratio τc2/τc1. Here, in this tax program, τc1 = τc2 = τc.T h u s ,
eﬀective taxation on consumption of the old generation needs to be lowered
as γ rises. This is achieved by lowering the capital income tax τk. Therefore,
uniform consumption tax rates in practice. How should one stop young people from buying
for old people (arbitrage)?
5Arbitrage can be ruled out for this equivalent tax program, as labor income tax rates
can easily be set on an individual level, e.g., according to age. In particular, consider a
uniform consumption tax rate τc plus a tax on labor income, τw, in (10). Set τc equal
to τc1,a n ds e tτw = βc 2/(Rwδ). Then, the tax program with the uniform consumption
tax τc plus the tax on labor income τw is equivalent to the program with age-conditioned
consumption tax rates.
6an increase in the desire for status shifts the tax burden from capital income
to consumption.
Consider an increase in γ1 or in γ2 with the other status parameter held
constant. Then the consumption tax rate rises by less compared to the case
where both γ1 and γ2 rise by the same amount: (∂τ c/∂ γi−∂τ c/∂ γ)|γ1=γ2=γ =
−(β+δ)/[2[1−ρ(1−b)]δ(1−γ)2] < 0. The optimal consumption tax rate rises
by less because the status externality is lower compared to the case where
bothγ1 and γ2 rise. As τc rises by less, the optimal capital income tax rate de-
clines by less: (|∂τ k/∂ γi|−|∂τ k/∂ γ|)|γ1=γ2=γ = −[1−ρ(1−b)]β/[2(β+δ)] <
0.
4 Conclusions
The present paper investigates optimal tax schemes in the presence of two
consumption externalities. On the one hand consumption degrades the en-
vironment. On the other hand, as households exhibit a desire for (con-
sumption) status, consumption of one household lowers utility of all other
households. The paper shows that both a consumption tax program with a
higher tax rate for old-age consumption and a consumption tax plus interest
income tax program internalize the externalities. An increase in the desire
for status ﬁrst, raises consumption tax rates, second, lowers the extent by
which the optimal consumption tax rates diﬀer, and third, lowers the optimal
tax rate on capital income.
The discussion presented here is related to the literature on double div-
idends (see Goulder 1995) by the fact that the tax programs oﬀer an ad-
ditional dividend. Reducing the environmental externality also reduces the
status externality (“third dividend”). However, there is no swap of envi-
ronmental taxes for distortionary taxes. Thus the tax programs discussed
here do not reduce the distortionary cost of an existing tax system (second
dividend). Whether the “third dividend” suﬃces to support the claim of
an “Intermediate Form” or “Strong Form” (Goulder 1995) of double (triple)
dividend, however, clearly is a question of future research.
Appendix: The Social Optimum Reconsidered
The Discounted Optimum. Let the social planner discount future gener-




























−1,m −1,k −1,k 0,E 0 are exogenously given.
Consider ∂ L/∂ kt+1 =0 ,a n di n s e r tλt and λt+1 from ∂ L/∂ mt =0a n d
∂ L/∂ mt+1 =0 . T h i sg i v e sµt as a function of µt+1. Next, Consider
∂ L/∂ Et+1 =0 ,a n di n s e r tµt. The resulting equation together with the



























1 − b − f (kt+2)
ρf (kt+2)[1 − b − f (kt+1)]
. (18)
The remaining intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions follow from ∂ L/∂ c1
t =0 ,
and ∂ L/∂ c2
t = 0 by taking (16) and (17) into account.
In a steady state (18) becomes: f (k)=1 /ρ. By setting kt = k,a n d
Et = E, the remaining steady state conditions (5) to (9) follow immediately.
The Undiscounted Optimum. Let the social planner treat all generations
symmetrically: ρ = 1. Then (4) is no longer bounded, and social welfare is
evaluated according to the long-run average criterion:
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Dutta (1991, p.75) shows in Theorem 3 that as ρ → 1 the limit of the solution
to the social planner’s problem with ρ<1 equals the solution to the social
planner’s problem when ρ = 1 (long-run average problem) whenever “value-
boundedness” in Dutta’s (1991) sense (which holds in the present case) holds.
For this reason, we ﬁnd the ﬁrst order conditions simply by setting ρ =1
















2 + k + m,
E = −β (c
1 + c
2)/b + δm / b.
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